By Sital Somaiya, Founder and Solicitor. Last reviewed 15 October 2026.
Key points
- A common intention constructive trust gives you a share of a home you are not named on, if you can prove you both intended to share it and you relied on that.
- There are two stages. First, prove the intention to share. Second, prove how big your share is.
- At the first stage the court looks for real evidence of what you both intended. It will not invent an intention because the result seems fair.
- Once the first stage is met, the court can decide a fair share looking at the whole course of dealing between you.
This is the claim most people mean when they say “I’m not on the deeds, but it’s my home too.” It is the main route to a share for an unmarried partner, and also the one that most often fails, usually because the evidence of a shared intention is missing.
Before reading on, our TOLATA checker can give a quick indication of whether your circumstances point towards a claim.
In this guide
- Why this matters for unmarried couples
- The two-stage test
- How the law got here
- Express discussions, and the “excuse” cases
- Evidence that helps, and evidence that does not
- Detrimental reliance
- Constructive trust, resulting trust or estoppel?
- Frequently asked questions
- Talk to us
Why this matters for unmarried couples
When a married couple divorce, the court can share property according to needs and fairness, whoever owns it. When an unmarried couple separate, it cannot. The question is simply who owns what, applying property law. There is no such thing as common law marriage. If the home is in your partner’s name, a constructive trust is often the way to show that some of it belongs to you. See our guide to cohabiting couples’ rights.
The two-stage test
| Stage | The question | How the court decides |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Acquisition | Did you both intend that you would have a share of the home, and did you rely on that? | From real evidence: what you said to each other and what you did. The court infers the intention from conduct, but cannot simply impute one because it seems fair. |
| 2. Quantification | If so, how big is your share? | From what you agreed if you can prove it. If not, the court decides what is fair, looking at the whole course of dealing in relation to the property. |
The second stage was set out in Jones v Kernott, and the Court of Appeal confirmed in Geary v Rankine (2012) that a claimant in a sole name case must clear the first stage before the court will think about fairness. In Geary, a woman who had worked unpaid in her partner’s guest house failed because she could not show any shared intention that she would own part of the property.
How the law got here
| Case | What it said | Where it stands now |
|---|---|---|
| Lloyds Bank v Rosset (1990) | Only two kinds of evidence count: express discussions about sharing, or direct contributions to the purchase price or mortgage. | Heavily criticised. The House of Lords said in Stack v Dowden that the bar was set too high. |
| Abbott v Abbott (2007) | The court should look at the parties’ whole course of conduct in relation to the property. | The current approach, applied in sole name cases. |
| Stack v Dowden (2007) | Joint names start at equal shares; context and conduct matter in finding intentions. | Still the leading joint names case, with Jones v Kernott. |
| Jones v Kernott (2011) | A fair share can be decided where an intention to share is shown but the figure is not. | Applies to sole name cases at the quantification stage. |
| Graham-York v York (2015) | A long-term partner was awarded 25% of a home in her late partner’s sole name. | Fairness at the second stage does not mean equality, even in a long relationship. |
Express discussions, and the “excuse” cases
The strongest evidence is a conversation in which you agreed you would share the home. Interestingly, the classic examples are cases where the owner gave an excuse for not putting the partner on the title.
- Eves v Eves (1975): a man told his partner she was too young to be on the deeds. The court treated the excuse as showing that, but for it, she would have been. She was awarded a share.
- Grant v Edwards (1986): a man said putting his partner on the title might complicate her divorce. Again, the excuse showed a shared understanding that she was meant to own part.
So if your partner told you there was a reason you could not be added “yet”, that can be valuable evidence. Write down what was said, when and where, while you remember.
Evidence that helps, and evidence that does not
| Helps | Does not help much on its own |
|---|---|
| Paying part of the deposit | Paying for food and household shopping |
| Paying the mortgage, or part of it, regularly | Decorating and minor DIY |
| Texts or emails about the home being “ours” | Living there for a long time |
| An excuse for not being on the title | Having children together |
| Paying for major works because you believed you had a share | Being in a long, committed relationship |
| Both incomes being relied on for the mortgage | Paying rent to your partner |
Things in the right-hand column are not irrelevant. Once you have cleared the first stage, the court looks at the whole course of dealing to decide your share, and they can all form part of that picture. They are just rarely enough to prove the intention in the first place.
Detrimental reliance
It is not enough that you both intended to share. You must also have acted on that intention in a way that would leave you worse off if your partner could deny it. Paying towards the mortgage, giving up a home of your own, or funding works usually does this. Of the four, this is the element most often satisfied once there is good evidence of a shared intention.
Constructive trust, resulting trust or estoppel?
If you paid part of the purchase price, you might think a resulting trust gives you a share in proportion to what you paid. In family homes the courts now usually prefer the constructive trust, because it looks at the whole relationship rather than just the money at the start. If your partner made promises you relied on, proprietary estoppel may also apply, and claims often run both arguments together.
An example
Natalie moved into Chris’s house in Collier Row in 2014. Chris said they would remortgage in joint names “once his credit score recovered”. From then on, Natalie paid half the mortgage each month into his account, with the reference “mortgage”. They had two children. They separated this year and Chris says the house is his.
Stage one: the excuse about his credit score and her regular mortgage payments are good evidence of a shared intention that she would own part, and she relied on it. Stage two: the court would look at the whole course of dealing, including what each paid and for how long, to decide a fair share. It would not necessarily be 50%.
This is an illustrative example, not a real case.
Frequently asked questions
Can I claim a share if I only paid the bills?
It is difficult. Paying bills on its own rarely proves a shared intention to own the home, though it may help if it was part of an arrangement that let your partner pay the mortgage. Evidence of conversations about ownership would make a big difference.
What does common intention mean?
It means you both intended, or are taken from your conduct to have intended, that the home would be shared. A private hope on one side is not enough; the intention has to be shared.
Can the court give me a share just because it is fair?
Not at the first stage. You have to prove an actual shared intention first. Only then can the court decide the size of your share by reference to fairness and the whole course of dealing.
Does it matter how long we lived together?
Length of relationship alone does not create a share. It becomes relevant once you have proved an intention to share, because the court looks at the whole history when deciding how big the share should be.
Do I need to bring a court case?
Not always. Many claims settle after a detailed letter setting out the evidence, or at mediation. If not, the claim is brought under TOLATA, and our TOLATA guide explains the process.
Sources
- Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, section 14, legislation.gov.uk
- Jones v Kernott, [2011] UKSC 53, UK Supreme Court
- Law of Property Act 1925, section 53, legislation.gov.uk
Talk to us
Signature Law acts on constructive trust claims for and against partners in Romford, Essex and East London. Try our TOLATA checker, read our TOLATA claim guide, or speak to our cohabitation solicitors.
Request a callback, or call 01708 398 851.
